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Abstract
U.S. investors allocate 30-40% of their financial asset portfolio in the stock of the
company stock they work for. Such a portfolio flies in the face of standard portfolio
theory, which prescribes that an investor should hold less of a financial asset that is
positively correlated with her undiversified labor income. Nevertheless, we propose a
rational explanation that prescribes a long position in own company stock. Precisely
because the own company stock is positively correlated with the investor’s labor in-
come, any information the investor learns about her earnings is a partial information
advantage in her own company stock. When confronted with a choice of what informa-
tion to acquire, employees may choose to learn about their own firm. Learning lowers
the employee’s risk of holding own-firm equity, which raises its risk-adjusted returns
and makes a long position optimal.
∗Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh: svnieuwe@stern.nyu.edu, NYU Stern, Finance Department, 44 West 4th
St., 9th floor, New York, NY 10012. Laura Veldkamp: lveldkam@stern.nyu.edu, NYU Stern, Economics
Department, 44 West 4th St., 7th floor, New York, NY 10012. JEL classification: F30, G11, D82. Keywords:
Own company stock, asymmetric information, information theory.
Conventional wisdom dictates that an employee should take small or negative positions
in her own company’s equity, in order to hedge labor income risk (Baxter and Jermann
(1997)). However, there is another way to reduce that risk: learn about future labor income
realizations and adjust work effort accordingly. Learning is a substitute for hedging. Yet
while hedging motives make own company stock less attractive, learning makes iy more
attractive. Learning creates a private information advantage that induces an employee to
hold more company stock, on average. We investigate how the incentives to hedge and to
learn compete, and show that holding own-firm stock may not be so puzzling after all.
U.S. employees hold a large fraction of their portfolio in their own company’s stock.
Mitchell and Utkus (2002) document that 29% of assets in defined contribution plans
are invested in own company stock.When direct and indirect ownership in own company
stock is accounted for, 40% of directly and indirectly held public equity is invested in
own company stock (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2001)). This behavior challenges
standard portfolio theory, because an investor’s human wealth is undiversified and tends to
covary with payoffs to company stock; both depend on company performance. A diversified
portfolio would therefore contain a small long or even short position in company stock.
The fact that labor income is a large risk makes both diversification and learning more
valuable. Each has an opposite effect on her optimal portfolio. We model an investor who
faces uncertainty about the payoffs from work as well as the payoffs from her financial port-
folio. The latter consists of own company stock and other financial assets (‘the market’).
The employee has a fixed capacity to learn about future labor income and/or future income
from the market asset, before choosing her work effort and asset portfolio. We characterize
conditions under which she prefers to use all capacity to reduce uncertainty about labor
income. Income information is particularly valuable because it enables the employee to
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adjust work effort and minimize a large risk in her total wealth portfolio. Because labor
income and the payoff to company stock are positively correlated, the employee who learns
about labor income reduces uncertainty about her company’s stock in the process. This
reduction in risk effectively increases her risk-adjusted own company stock return. Her
optimal portfolio tilts towards a long position in own company stock. We show that inside
information can overwhelm the competing desire to hold a portfolio that insures against
labor income risk.
Modeling learning choices, rather than endowing employees with an information advan-
tage, helps to explain cross-sectional variation in own company stock holdings. Employees
of small and stand alone firms hold more company stock than employees of larger and con-
glomerate firms. If employees move from stand alone firms to conglomerates, they reduce
own company stock (Cohen (2004)). Our model rationalizes these facts. If small firms’
labor income covaries more with stock payoffs, then the ability to make better inference
about company stock makes employees want to hold more of it.
We concur with Massa and Simonov (2005) who argue that loyalty (Cohen (2004)),
familiarity (Huberman (2001), Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004)), and ambiguity (Boyle,
Uppal and Wang (2003)) capture information advantages. They find that familiarity affects
less-informed investors more, diminishes when the profession or location of the investor
changes, and generates higher returns. By explicitly introducing an information choice,
our theory can explain where these information advantages come from.
2
1 Model
This is a one-shot decision problem for an employee.1 In period 1, the employee makes her
learning choice. She allocates a fixed amount of precision between two signals: one about
her wage, and one about the payoff of the market asset. In period 2, she observes her
chosen signals and makes her investment choice. In period 3, she receives the asset payoffs
and her wage, and consumes.
Preferences In order to study information acquisition, we want to start with investors
who have a preference for early resolution of uncertainty. Investors, with absolute risk
aversion parameter ρ, maximize their expected certainty equivalent wealth:2
U = E1 {− log (E2[exp(−ρW )])} . (1)
The term − log (E2[exp(−ρW )]) is the level of consumption that makes the investor indif-
ferent between consuming that amount for certain and investing in her optimal portfolio,
in period 2. This certainty equivalent consumption is conditional on the realization of the
employee’s signals. Since these signals are not known in period 1, the investor maximizes
the expected period-2 certainty equivalent, conditioning on information in prior beliefs.
Budget Constraint Let r > 1 be the risk-free return and (qm, qc) and (pm, pc) be the
number of shares the investor chooses to hold and the asset prices of market assets (m)
and company assets (c). Investor’s terminal wealth is then her initial wealth W0, plus the
1See VanNieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2005b) for how to embed this in a general equilibrium model
with a continuum of atomless investors.
2Utility can instead be defined over consumption by assuming that all wealth is consumed at the end of
period 3. This formulation of utility has the desirable feature that it treats learned information and prior
information as equivalent. It does so without losing the exponential structure of preferences that will keep
the problem tractable.
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profit she earns on her portfolio investments, plus the fixed component of labor income ω¯,
and its variable component which takes the form of a bonus fω (net of the cost of effort),
which the agent will receive if she exerts effort (`):
W = rW0 + qm(fm − pmr) + qc(fc − pcr) + ω¯ + `fω (2)
To keep the model simple, effort is a binary choice ` ∈ {0, 1}.
Initial information The employee is endowed with normally distributed prior beliefs
about the payoff of the market fm ∼ N(µm, σ2m), the payoff of own company stock fc ∼
N(µc, σ2c ) and the amount of her bonus fω ∼ N(µω, σ2ω). For simplicity, the market payoff
fm is independent of the bonus fω and the own company stock payoff fc.3 This stacks
the deck against us: making market payoffs independent of labor income creates strong
incentives to diversify.
To capture the idea that holding company stock is a bad way to diversify labor income
risk, fω and fc are correlated. Both load on a common factor γ:
fω = µω + βγ + ² and fc = µc + γ. (3)
The bonus contains an idiosyncratic component ² ∼ N(0, σ2ε), orthogonal to γ ∼ N(0, σ2γ).
This structure imposes restrictions on the relationships between variances in the model:
σ2ω = β
2σ2γ + σ
2
² , σ
2
c = σ
2
γ , and cov(fc, fω) ≡ ξ = βσ2γ .
3VanNieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2005a) show how to set up a related problem when payoffs are
correlated.
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Information Acquisition At time 1, the employee chooses how much to learn about the
market payoff and her bonus. She chooses the precision of two signals: ηm ∼ N(fm, σ2ηm)
and ηω ∼ N(fω, σ2ηω). Because of Bayes’ law, we can bypass the choice of signals, and
model the choice over the posterior beliefs directly. An investor’s posterior belief about
the payoffs fi, i = m,ω, conditional on a prior belief µi and signal ηi, is formed from:
µˆi ≡ E[fi|µi, ηi] =
(
σ−2i + σ
−2
ηi
)−1 (
σ−2i µi + σ
−2
ηi ηi
)
(4)
with variance that is a harmonic mean of the signal variances:
σˆ2i ≡ V [fi|µi, ηi] =
(
σ−2i + σ
−2
ηi
)−1
. (5)
In the appendix we also derive updating formulas for σˆ2ε and σˆ
2
γ using the Kalman filter.
There are 2 constraints governing how the investor can choose her signals about risk
factors. The first is the capacity constraint. Capacity K can then be interpreted as the
percentage by which an investor can decrease the risk she faces, where risk is measured as
the generalized standard deviation of asset payoffs and labor income: σˆ2mσˆ
2
ω ≥ e−2Kσ2mσ2ω.
This capacity constraint is one possible description of a learning technology. We think
it is a relevant constraint because it is a commonly-used distance measure in econometrics
(a log likelihood ratio); it has a long history as a quantity measure in information theory
(Shannon (1948)); it is a measure of information complexity (Cover and Thomas (1991)),
and it has been used to describe limited information processing ability in economic settings
(Sims (2003)).
The second constraint is the no negative learning constraint : the investor cannot acquire
signals that transmit negative information. We rule this out by requiring the variance of
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both signals to be positive. This implies that the posterior beliefs have a variance that is
not greater than the prior beliefs: σˆ2m ≤ σ2m and σˆ2ω ≤ σ2ω.
2 Results: Learning and Portfolio Choices
To solve the model, we work backwards. At time 2 the investor chooses her optimal asset
portfolio (qm, qc) and her optimal work effort ` ∈ {0, 1}, taking as given the posterior means
µˆi and variances σˆi, where i = {m, c, ω}.
Optimal Portfolio Choice Substituting the budget constraint (2) into the objective
function (1), dropping the constant multiplier (ρrW0 + ρω¯), and taking period-2 expecta-
tions of a log normal variable delivers:
E1
[
ρ {qm(µˆm − pmr) + qc(µˆc − pcr) + `µˆω} − ρ
2
2
{
q2mσˆ
2
m + q
2
c σˆ
2
c + `
2σˆ2ω + 2qc`ξˆ
}]
First order conditions with respect to qm and qc of the terms inside the expectation delivers
the optimal portfolio rules:
qm =
1
ρ
σˆ−2m (µˆm − pmr) =
1
σmρ
(
µˆm − pmr
σm
)
ym (6)
qc =
1
ρ
σˆ−2c (µˆc − pcr)− σˆ−2c `ξˆ =
1
σcρ
(
µˆc − pcr
σc
)
yc − `β
(
yc
yω
)
(7)
where yi = σˆ−2i /σ
−2
i is the proportional increase in belief precision for i = m, c, ω. The
appendix shows that the covariance between company payoffs and the bonus, conditional
on the signal ηω, is ξˆ = βσ2γy
−1
ω . Learning about wages (yω > 1) lowers its conditional
covariance with company stock payoffs. This is one reason that the optimal holdings of
6
company stock rise.
Optimal Work Effort Choice The employee exerts high effort (` = 1) iff4
µˆω − β(µˆc − pcr)
(
yc
yω
)
− ρ
2
(
σˆ2ω − σˆ2γβ2
(
yc
yω
)2)
> 0. (8)
The term involving posterior beliefs µˆω−βµˆc is the only component of the labor decision not
known at time 1. It is a function of constants and the posterior beliefs βγˆ (1− yc/yω) + εˆ,
which are determined by the value of the observed signal ηω. Thus, the employee exerts
high effort when her signal about the bonus is above a cutoff. Condition (8) is equivalent
to D(yω)ηω > C(yω), where D(yω) =
(
1− (yc/yω)(β2σ2γ/σ2ω)
)
(1 − y−1ω ), and the cutoff
C(yω) = −µω + σ2ω(β(µc − pcr) + σ2ερ/2)/(σ2εyω + β2σ2γ) (see appendix for details).
Assumption 1. The agent is indifferent between working and not working, given prior
information only: C(1) = 0, or equivalently, µω = β(µc − pcr) + ρ2σ2ε .
The assumption equates the prior expected bonus µω with the cost of labor income
risk. When the employee hedges γ-risk by holding less own-company stock, β(µc − pcr) is
the asset payoff she forgoes. The idiosyncratic ε-risk cannot be hedged, and has utility cost
ρ
2σ
2
ε . Assumption 1 makes the agent ex-ante uncertain about whether exerting high effort
is optimal. This avoids a situation where information about labor income is not valuable
because the employee is (almost) certain that she will or will not work.
Optimal Information Choice At time 1, when information is chosen, signals {ηm, ηω},
and thus labor and portfolio choices are random variables. We define three pieces of new
4This result follows from substituting the optimal portfolios back into the utility function:
E1
[
1
2
(
µˆm−pmr
σm
)2
ym +
1
2
(
µˆc−pcr
σc
)2
yc + ρ`
(
µˆω − (µˆc − pcr)β
(
yc
yω
))
− ρ2`2
2
(
σˆ2ω − σˆ2γβ2
(
yc
yω
)2)]
.
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notation. Let prior Sharpe ratios be θi = µi−pirσi for i = m, c. Let the standard deviation
of D(yω)ηω (a mean-zero normal variable) be denoted σD = D(yω)(σ2ω + σ
2
ηω)
.5. Let the
probability that the high effort is chosen be denoted Π = 1−Φ(C(yω)/σD), where Φ(·) and
φ(·) denote the standard normal c.d.f. and p.d.f.. The time-1 problem then is to choose
{ym, yω} to maximize the expected utility:
EU(yω, ym) =
1
2
ym(1 + θ2m) +
1
2
yc(1 + θ2c ) + ρ
(
φ
(
C(yω)
σD
)
σD − C(yω)
)
Π.
subject to the capacity constraint ymyω ≤ e2K and the no-forgetting constraints ym ≥ 1,
yω ≥ 1. The first two terms represent expected portfolio holdings, times payoffs, which are
squared Sharpe ratios, with mean equal to 1+θ2i . The third term is the posterior expected
value of working hard E1 [` (D(yω)ηω − C(yω))]. We can think of there being one choice
variable yω, the capacity devoted to learning about one’s bonus fω, with ym = e2Ky−1ω
because the capacity constraint holds with equality.
The marginal value of information about the bonus consists of five terms:
MUω(yω;µω, µc, pc, r, β, ρ, σε, σγ) =
1
2
(1 + θ2m)
∂ym
∂yω
+
1
2
(1 + θ2c )
∂yc
∂yω
+ ρ
∂ΠσDφ
(
C(yω)
σD
)
∂yω
− ρC(yω) ∂Π
∂yω
− ρΠ∂C(yω)
∂yω
The first term represents the foregone benefit of using capacity to reduce uncertainty about
the market asset. The second term shows that the higher the squared Sharpe ratio of the
agent’s own company stock, the more profit she can make by using her inside information
to take large long or short positions in the stock. The third term captures the benefit of
working hard er when bonuses are larger. The last two terms measure the positive effect of
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learning on the probability of working hard. When the agent learns more about her bonus,
working hard becomes less risky, and thus more desirable. (See appendix for proof.)
The next two propositions show when it is optimal to learn about the bonus instead
of the market. This depends on whether the objective function is convex or concave. The
appendix gives the conditions for convexity and concavity. Numerical examples described
below show that the objective function is typically convex.
Proposition 1. If the objective is convex in yω, and if EU(e2K , 1) > EU(1, e2K), then the
optimal strategy is to use all capacity to learn about fω.
Proposition 2. If the objective function is concave and (i) if MU(1; ·) > 0, then the opti-
mal information acquisition strategy uses some capacity to learn about fω; (ii) ifMU(e2K ; ·) >
0, then the optimal information acquisition strategy is to use all capacity to learn about fω.
Own Company Stock Bias The optimal portfolio (6) and (7) depends on the ran-
dom signal realization in period two. We therefore characterize own company bias in the
expected portfolios.
Proposition 3. The optimal expected asset portfolio is E1[qm] = ymθm/(ρσm) and E1[qc] =
ycθc/(ρσc)− βΠyc/yω.
For comparison, consider the portfolio allocation in the benchmark model without learn-
ing capacity (K = 0): E1[qno learnm ] = θm/(ρσm) and E1[q
no learn
c ] = θc/(ρσc) − βΠno learn.
When labor income payoffs are positively correlated with own company stock payoffs
(β > 0), the benchmark model prescribes a lower position in the own company stock
(−βΠno learn < 0). This is the hedging effect of Baxter and Jermann (1997).
When employees can learn (K > 0), and they choose to learn about labor income
(yω > 1), two effects operate on expected portfolios. The first is an information effect:
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learning about labor income provides information about company stock. This leads the
employee to tilt her portfolio towards a longer position in own company stock (provided
θc > 0). The largest tilt occurs when all capacity is devoted to learning about labor income:
yω = e2K . Second, learning affects the need to hedge labor income risk. On the one hand,
learning causes the employee to work harder and generates more labor income to hedge, on
average. This decreases E[qc]. On the other hand, hedging is not as useful because some
of that risk is already being resolved through learning. This increases E[qc]. The net effect
on the hedging component of the portfolio is ambiguous. We now illustrate these effects
with a numerical example.
Numerical Example We set the prior mean-to-variance ratio of both assets equal so
that in the benchmark case with riskless labor income and no signals, the investor would
then hold an equal amount of each. We set ρ = 3, σm = .20, β = .8, σγ = σc = .30, σε = .05.
For these parameters, the Sharpe ratio on the market θm = .4 and the Sharpe ratio on
own-company stock is θc = .6. We then give the employee enough capacity to eliminate
40% of the volatility in the market asset or in the bonus through learning (K = .4). Figure
1), left panel, shows that it is optimal to specialize in learning about the bonus (illustrates
proposition 1). The right panel compares the expected portfolios across yω (proposition
3). Since the optimal choice is yω = e2K , we read off the optimal portfolios on the right of
the graph. Relative to the benchmark no-learning case (yω = 1), the employee optimally
holds a long position in own-company stock, which is much higher than in the no-learning
economy (57% versus 28%).
Cross-Sectional Patterns Cohen (2004) documents that employees of conglomerates
allocate a smaller fraction of their discretionary 401(k) contributions to own company stock
10
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Figure 1: Expected Utility and Portfolio for Various Learning Choices (β = 0.8).
The right panel plots expected holdings of market and own-firm assets held in our model (solid
lines) and a no-learning economy (dashed lines). Since the utility maximizing learning choice is
yω = e2K , the optimal learning portfolio is the amount of each asset at the intersection with the
right axis. The parameters are as in the text. The employee has learning capacity of K = 0.4, so
that the upper bound for yω is e2K = 2.23.
than employees of stand-alone firms. He argues this is due to stronger loyalty to stand-alone
firms. Our information-based story rationalizes this fact.
We model conglomerate firms as low-β firms: their employees’ bonus is less correlated
with company stock payoffs. A lower β affects portfolios in three ways. First, a lower β
weakens the information effect: information about the bonus generates less information
about own company stock (∂yc/∂β > 0). More uncertainty makes holding own-company
stock less desirable. Second, a lower β has an ambiguous effect on hedging (−βΠyc/yω).
The lower conditional covariance of stock payoffs and labor income (∂βycy−1ω /∂β > 0)
makes the employee want to hedge less. But, when labor income becomes less risky (σ2ω falls
because β2σ2γ falls), the employee work harder (∂Π/∂β < 0) and has more expected income
to hedge. Third, when β declines, the value of information about the bonus may decline
enough so that the optimal learning strategy switches from specialization in learning about
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the bonus (yω = e2K) to specialization in learning about the market (yω = 1). Figure 2
illustrates this. When β = .4 instead of .8, it is optimal to learn about the market (yω = 1).
Such a switch discretely reduces own company stock holdings to the same level as in the
no-learning model.
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Figure 2: Expected Utility and Portfolios for Various Learning Choices (β = 0.4).
Since the utility maximizing learning choice is yω = 1, the optimal learning portfolio is the amount
of each asset at the intersection with the left axis.
3 Conclusion
This paper explores learning about risky labor income as a rational explanation for the
own company stock puzzle. It augments VanNieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2005a) with
labor income risk that can be resolved by hedging (holding less company stock), or by
learning. Learning induces an employee to tilt her portfolio towards own company stock,
while reducing the need to hedge labor income risk. Under conditions described in the
paper, the opportunity to learn makes an own company stock ‘bias’ optimal.
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A Technical Details
Posterior variances and covariances We start by deriving the relationship between precision
ratios yc ≡ σˆ−2γ /σ−2γ and yω ≡ σˆ−2ω /σ−2ω . The posterior precision about the bonus is the prior precision
plus the signal precision: yω = 1 + σ
−2
ηω /σ
−2
ω . Therefore σ
2
ηω = (yω − 1)−1σ2ω. The posterior variances σˆ2²
and σˆ2γ are obtained from the Kalman filter:
σˆ2² = σ
2
²
(
β2σ2γ + σ
2
ηω
σ2² + β2σ2γ + σ2ηω
)
= σ2²
(
1− σ
2
²
σ2ω
(1− y−1ω )
)
, (9)
σˆ2γ = σ
2
γ
(
σ2² + σ
2
ηω
σ2² + β2σ2γ + σ2ηω
)
= σ2γ
(
1− β
2σ2γ
σ2ω
(1− y−1ω )
)
(10)
Rearranging (10), the extra precision about the own company stock payoff, inferred from the signal about
the bonus is: yc = (σ
2
² +β
2σ2γ)/(σ
2
² +β
2σ2γy
−1
ω ). Note that if yω = 1, then yc = 1. Learning more about the
bonus (yω > 1) increases the posterior precision of the own company stock (yc > 1), but not by the same
amount:
∂yc
∂yω
= β2σ2γ
σ2² + β
2σ2γ
[σ2²yω + β2σ2γ ]2
∈ [0, 1],
Learning more about future labor income increases the own company asset precision at a decreasing rate
(∂2yc/∂y
2
ω < 0). Therefore, there are decreasing returns in the expected investment profit to learning about
labor information.
Conditional on seeing the signal ηω, the (posterior) covariance between fc and fω is ξˆ = βσˆ
2
γ +
Cov(γ, ε|ηω). Combining yω, (9), and (10) and the formula for the variance of a sum, yields ξˆ = βσ2γy−1ω .
Work Effort Choice Using expressions in (3), condition (8) can be written as βγˆ(1− yc/yω) + εˆ >
C(yω), where
C(yω) =
ρ
2
(
σˆ2ω − β2σˆ2γ
(
yc
yω
)2)
− µω + β(µc − pcr)
(
yc
yω
)
.
C(yω) can then be manipulated to yield the expression in the text. We posit βγˆ(1− yc/yω) + εˆ = D(yω)ηω
and use the Kalman filtering formulas εˆ = (σ2εηω)/(σ
2
ω+σ
2
ηω) and γˆ = (β
2σ2γηω)/(σ2ω+σ2ηω) to solve for D(yω).
The standard deviation of D(yω)η is σD = D(yω)(σ
2
ω + σ
2
ηω)
.5 = (σωσ
2
ε(y
2
ω − yω).5)/(σ2εyω + β2σ2γ).
Evaluating derivatives Two key derivatives needed to evaluate the marginal utility w.r.t. yω are:
∂C(yω)
∂yω
= − σ
2
ωσ
2
ε
(σ2εyω + β2σ2γ)2
(
β(µc − pcr) + ρ
2
σ2ε
)
< 0
∂σD
∂yω
=
σωσ
2
ε(.5σ
2
εyω + β
2σ2γ(yω − .5))
(y2ω − yω).5(σ2εyω + β2σ2γ)2 > 0
Define x ≡ C(yω)/σD < 0, negative by assumption 1. Combining all terms of the marginal utility of yω:
MUω(yω;µω, µc, pc, r, β, ρ, σε, σγ) =
1
2
(1 + θ2c)
∂yc
∂yω
+ ρφ (x)
∂σD
∂yω
− ρΠ∂C(yω)
∂yω
> 0 (11)
where
∂x
∂yω
=
1
σD
[
∂C(yω)
∂yω
− x∂σD
∂yω
]
∂Π
∂yω
= −φ (x) ∂x
∂yω
∂ΠE[D(yω)ηω|D(yω)ηω ≥ C(yω)]
∂yω
= φ (x)
[(
1 + x2
) ∂σD
∂yω
− x∂C(yω)
∂yω
]
.
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Since ∂C(yω)/∂yω < 0, MU(yω) is always positive. The total marginal utility w.r.t. yω also contains
the term − 1
2
(1 + θ2m)e
2Ky−2ω , which measures how ym changes as the employee increases yω, through the
capacity constraint ymyω = e
2K .
Concavity, convexity and optimal yω The objective function is convex when the following
second derivative of utility w.r.t yω is positive, and concave when it is negative. The expression is a long,
but straightforward function of yω and parameters only.
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The first term is positive: ∂2yc/∂y
2
ω = 2e
2Ky−3ω . We already showed that yc is concave in yω: ∂
2yc/∂y
2
ω < 0
and the second term is negative. It can be shown that ∂2σD/∂y
2
ω < 0 and ∂
2C(yω)/∂y
2
ω > 0, so that the
third and fourth terms are negative as well. The last term is clearly positive.
If the objective function is convex ∀yω ∈ (1, e2K), full specialization always arises. It is optimal to learn
about the bonus if the objective is higher at yω = e
2K then at ym = e
2K (proposition 1). If the objective is
concave, and MUω(1; ·) > 0, then it is optimal to allocate the first increment of capacity towards learning
about the bonus instead of the market (proposition 2, first part). If also MUω(e
2K ; ·) > 0, then allocating
the last increment of capacity to learning about the bonus is still more valuable than allocating it to learning
about the market, and full specialization in learning about the bonus takes place (proposition, second part).
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